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ACHAEUS, THE PTOLEMIES AND THE FOURTH SYRIAN WAR
The second half of the 3rd century saw the Seleucid monarchy weaken considerably. The 
reign of Seleucus II brought diffi cult battles against Ptolemy III Euergetes (the Third Syr-
ian War) and attempts to overcome massive internal problems. During the war against 
Egypt, he ultimately managed to recapture northern Syria but Ptolemy III held on to the 
port of Seleucia Pieria, which was key for the Seleucids, and captured a number of places 
in Asia Minor. It was there that the Seleucids suffered their greatest territorial losses 
– they lost almost all their footholds on the coasts of Cilicia, Lycia, Caria and Ionia. 
The Egyptian king even seized Ainos and Maronea on the Thracian coast.1 What also 
had an impact on Seleucus II losing his infl uences in Asia Minor was his fratricidal war 
against Antiochus Hierax, backed by the kings of Pergamon, Capadocia and Bithynia. 
The defeated Seleucus had to reconcile himself with his brother’s independence in Asia 
Minor; the latter, however, subsequently suffered a defeat in his war against Pergamon, 
which ultimately led to the Seleucids losing their Asian Minor territories.2 The dynasty 
also faced enormous challenges in the East, where Bactria and Sogdiana seceded, and 
Parthia was seized by the Parni.3
The state’s situation did not improve during the short reign of Seleucus III Keraunos, 
Seleucus II’s son and heir. His assassination in 223 during a campaign against Attalus I, 
the king of Pergamon, became another destabilising factor. At this critical moment, the 
army offered the royal diadem to Achaeus. However, the experienced general, a close 
relative of the assassinated Seleucus, remained loyal and rejected the offer.4 As a re-
sult, Antiochus III, brother of the murdered Seleucus III, came into power at less than 
twenty years of age. He inherited a state whose territory was diminished and economy 
1 OGIS 54, 14–15; P.Haun. 6, frg. 1.1–13; Plb 5.34.8; cf. Schmitt 1964: 37–45; Bagnall 1976: 80–116; 
Huss 1976: 188–213; Bosquet 1986; Kirsten/Opelt 1989; Jones/Habicht 1989; Huss 2001: 427–436.
2 For the Antiochus Hierax see Ma 2000: 45–47.
3 On that topic and chronology see Wolski 1974: 154–199; Musti 1984: 213–214, 219–220; Wolski 
2003: 23–34; Assar 2006: 62–72; Gaslain 2009: 39–66.
4 Plb. 4.48.10. The nature of kinship between Antiochus III and Achaeus is uncertain. He might have 
been a cousin (Plb. 4.51.4) or an uncle (Beloch 1927: 205–206; Meloni 1949: 536–537; Schmitt 1964: 30–31; 
Billows 1995: 96–99). Achaeus had been Seleucus II’s general during the war against Antiochus Hierax 
(Polyaen. 4.17) and taken part in Seleucus III’s campaign (Plb. 4.48.7).
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weakened after losing a considerable portion of lands in Asia Minor and Iran. Achaeus, 
meanwhile, was appointed to govern the dynasty’s dominions in Asia Minor.
The complicated situation did not allow the young king to take over immediate and 
full control of what his brother had left him. In Asia Minor, he left the concern for the 
dynasty’s interests to Achaeus. Polybius, describing Achaeus’ scope of power, writes 
that he was in command of the countries west of the Taurus Mountains. This naturally 
does not refl ect the offi cial terminology of the Seleucid monarchy, and determining his 
precise position in the power structure is made diffi cult by a lack of relevant sources.5 
In any event, the arrangement at the time was nothing new in the history of the dy-
nasty; such a division of duties had been applied before – due to the sheer size of the 
monarchy it had been virtually necessary. Now such a solution seemed to be appropria-
te again; the relative remained loyal and carried out an effi cient fi ght with Attalus I, 
gradually rebuilding the dynasty’s reign in Asia Minor. The situation in the east was 
more diffi cult, with the satrap of Media, Molon, who had been given extensive author-
ity as the governor of the so called ‘upper satrapies’ by Antiochus, starting a rebellion.6 
Although sources seem to indicate that the reason for his revolt against the young king 
was a confl ict with the grey eminence on Antiochus’ court, the chief minister Hermeias, 
Molon also had suitable examples in the shape of Bactria and Parthia. It is therefore en-
tirely possible that Hermeias’ efforts (if he did indeed make such efforts) to exert more 
stringent control over satraps only hastened Molon’s rebellion. In Polybius’ account, 
Hermeias is presented in unequivocally negative light, which incidentally leads us to 
suspect that for the Seleucid court historiography (from which Polybius likely borrowed 
his description of the minister) he had become a scapegoat that had to be found on the 
Antioch court following some political failures.7
It was Hermeias who was supposedly responsible for underestimating the threat 
posed by Molon and for encouraging the king to attack Coele-Syria, which ended in de-
feat. It was only in the autumn of 221 that Antiochus III went east and defeated the rebel 
in a major battle, and the following year forced Artabazanes, the king of Media Atropa-
tene who had supported Molon, into submission.8 Soon afterwards, during the return to 
Antioch, Hermeias’ fate was sealed when he was put to death with the king’s consent.9
It was at that time that Achaeus’ usurpation took place, which was surprising consid-
ering his hitherto loyalty to the king, in particular the fact that he had refused to accept 
the diadem after the death of Seleucus II. In 220, Achaeus left his residence in Sardes 
and marched towards Syria, assuming the title of king in the Phrygian Laodicea on the 
Lycus River.10
Until then, Achaeus – using his extraordinary authority – had effi ciently represented 
the dynasty’s interests in the complex Asian Minor region. He had recaptured a number 
of cities: Teos, Kolophon, Myrina, Temnos, Aigai, Aeolis, Phocaea. He had managed to 
  5 Plb. 4.2.6, cf. Schmitt 1964: 158–160.
  6 Plb. 5.41–42. For Molon’s usurpation see Schmitt 1964: 116–129; Will 1982: 17–23; Fischer 1988.
  7 Cf. Schmitt 1964: 130–157; for Hermias, cf. Schmitt 1964: 150–158; for possible Polybius’ sources, 
cf. Schmitt 1964: 175–178; Lehmann 1967: 357–360; Walbank 1967: 570–571; Huss 1976: 8–20; Primo 
2009: 136–138.
  8 Plb. 5.53–55.
  9 Plb. 5.56.
10 Plb. 5.57.
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largely re-establish the Seleucids’ infl uences in Mysia and, presumably, also in Lydia, 
Phrygia and Lycaonia.11
What, then, made Achaeus turn against the rightful king, for whom he had willingly 
refused the diadem in the critical moments after the previous ruler had died? Polybius 
(4.48.11) attributes this decision to Achaeus’ exaggerated ambition; he had supposedly 
become audacious following his successes in the war against Pergamon. Scholars have 
tried to explain the decision in various ways. It has been suggested that perhaps Achaeus 
borrowed the idea from Antiochus Hierax, who had had the royal title and had also re-
sided in Sardes. It has also been pointed out that – as is indicated e.g. by the coins minted 
in Sardes even before the usurpation, which bore dynastic symbols – Achaeus might 
have truly believed in his right to the throne. The hypothesis that his fear of Hermeias’ 
intrigues or other unfriendly people surrounding Antiochus drove Achaeus to do such 
a thing is another guess.12 Further, it cannot be excluded that Achaeus received false 
news of the king’s death in the eastern provinces. The inspiration has also been thought 
to have come from the Ptolemaic diplomacy13 and this idea is worth reconsidering. The 
possible benefi ts that the Egyptians could have gained by winning over Achaeus seem 
quite clear and have been pointed out in research. However, Achaeus also could have 
made tangible profi ts by allying with the Ptolemies. His attempt to invade Syria, al-
though failed, indicates that he had much greater ambitions than just to rule Asia Minor 
independently.14 His goal was to dethrone Antiochus III. When embarking on such an 
ambitious plan, it was worth fi nding allies. Although Antiochus III was in the east at the 
time, he had just quelled Molon’s revolt, which had considerably improved his prestige 
and made him a dangerous enemy. Even though Achaeus still had more experience than 
his younger relative, he was no longer facing an enemy completely unacquainted with 
war. However, establishing cooperation would have been particularly valuable for the 
Egyptian rulers, not only in the light of their Asian Minor policy at the time, but fi rst and 
foremost because of the threat posed by Antiochus III in Coele-Syria – a land that had 
been the bone of contention between the two dynasties for several decades.
We do not know when the plan to recapture Coele-Syria was devised on the court 
in Antioch. According to some scholars, such a scheme had already been born under 
the rule of Seleucus III; others believe it was only Antiochus III who undertook this 
task.15 In fact, though, the question for these rulers based on the Orontes River was not 
‘whether’ but ‘when’ to start a war. The territory was too important for the Seleucids to 
ever reconcile themselves with its loss, particularly after the humiliation they suffered 
in the Laodicean War. Even disregarding Coele-Syria, the Ptolemies’ mere presence in 
11 Plb. 4.48.2; 5.77–78; Robert 1937: 194–196; Holleaux 1938: 33–34; Ma 2000: 55–56. The case of the 
poleis of the Troad is more contentious: OGIS 219; Hansen 1947: 40; Meloni 1949: 536; Piejko 1991: 33. 
However, it follows from Polybius’ account (5.78) that in 218 Ilion, Lampsakos and Alexandra in the Troad 
were under the infl uence of Attalus, which indicates that he had not lost them prior to that.
12 Schmitt 1964: 171–173; Will 1982: 23–26; Ma 2000: 57.
13 Scholars usually reject the possibility of Ptolemy cooperating with Achaeus at the very beginning of 
the rebellion, cf. e.g. Schmitt 1964: 166–167; Hölbl 2001: 129. Holleaux (1942: 132) and Huss (1976: 35–36) 
subscribed to the theory of Ptolemy’s inspiration as one of the reasons for Achaeus’ usurpation.
14 Plb. 5.57.
15 Bevan (1902: 204–205) and Schmitt (1964: 152–153) were in favour of the former theory. According 
to Huss (1976: 26–27) the plan was only conceived under Antiochus III.
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Seleucia Pieria was a thorn in the monarchy’s side. The Ptolemies must have realised 
that another war was unavoidable. Antiochus III had started war preparations when 
Ptolemy III Euergetes was the king of Egypt. Molon’s rebellion did not alter Antiochus’ 
plans. Initially, two generals and part of the troops were sent against the governor of 
the upper satrapies. The king himself still found the time to wed Laodice, a daughter 
of the king of Pontus; then – despite worrying news from the east, following the advice 
of Hermeias, who was a great supporter of the Syrian campaign – in the early summer 
of 221 he entered Coele-Syria with an army collected in Apamea.16 The Fourth Syrian 
War began. In the meantime, the throne in Alexandria had been taken over by Ptolemy 
IV Philopator. This, however, could only have served to encourage Antiochus to take 
action, since changes on the throne often cause temporary disorder in the state. How-
ever, both Polybius (5.34.10–11) and Justin (30.1.1–4) are wrong when they ascribe the 
decision to start the war to the situation in Alexandria and Ptolemy IV’s character. His 
unrestrained lifestyle and disregard for state affairs could not have had an infl uence on 
the Seleucid’s decision. Firstly, the war preparations had begun before Philopator took 
over the throne; secondly, it is doubtful whether Antioch had a clear idea of the new 
order in Alexandrian palaces.17
Antiochus’ attack on Coele-Syria ended, however, in defeat. The Ptolemaic intel-
ligence probably did a good job, allowing Theodotus of Aetolia, the Ptolemaic strategus 
of Coele-Syria, to prepare for the arrival of the enemy forces. He correctly assumed that 
the Seleucid king would not choose the coastal route, since local cities manned by Ptole-
maic garrisons would slow down his march, and the coast was under the complete con-
trol of the Egyptian fl eet.18 Antiochus led his army through the Massyas Valley (Bekaa), 
probably intending to follow the rivers Leontes and Jordan after crossing the valley. 
However, Theodotus skilfully used the lay of the land. The line of defence was prepared 
in the narrowest part of the valley, which is covered with marshes and lakes fi lled with 
thick reed. The key points of defence were the fortresses of Brochoi and Gerrha, tower-
ing over this part of the valley, with embankments and trenches, which Theodotus used 
to fortify the space between them. Attempts to cross the Ptolemaic defensive lines failed 
and the Seleucids’ forces suffered considerable losses.19 Theodotus’ small units mana-
ged to stop the whole army of enemies. A discouraged Antiochus, who also received bad 
news about Molon’s rebellion spreading, decided to retreat.
That attack, although unsuccessful, must have been the fi nal warning for Ptolemy IV 
and his advisors. Even though afterwards Antiochus was engaged in the east, the kings 
of Egypt must have realised that another war was merely a question of time. It would 
have, therefore, been natural for Ptolemy (or Sosibios, who in fact conducted state af-
fairs) to become more politically active in Asia Minor and attempt to fi nd another ally 
there. Achaeus – if the Egyptian notables had managed to enlist his help – would have 
16 Plb. 5.45.7–10.
17 Ancient writers (Plb. 5.34; 15.25.1–2; Plut. Cleom. 33.1; Athen. 13.577a; Iust. 30.1) left a very nega-
tive – and certainly too one-sided – picture of affairs on Ptolemy’s court and the king’s character, cf. Huss 
1976: 239–255; Hölbl 2001: 133–134.
18 From the 240s to 219 there is no information about the existence of a Seleucid fl eet. Theoretically, 
the Seleucids could have used the ships of Arados, but after the severe punishment infl icted on the city by 
Seleucus II this seems doubtful: Grainger 1991: 90–91.
19 Plb. 5.46.1–4.
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been a dangerous rival to Antiochus and could have forced the king to postpone a po-
ssible second invasion against Coele-Syria.20
The Ptolemies could have reaped great benefi ts from their cooperation with Achaeus 
also in the Asian Minor region. Egyptian dominions there could have turned out to be 
very important during another possible war for Coele-Syria. The cities of Asia Minor 
were a signifi cant place for recruiting mercenaries, and as the history of the Fourth Syr-
ian War shows, men recruited from there to Egypt during the frantic preparations in the 
winter of 218/217 played an important part in Ptolemy IV’s victory.21 An agreement with 
Achaeus, the most powerful man in Asia Minor at the time, would have been a valuable 
security for Ptolemaic dominions in the area. The situation in the region was very deli-
cate and the protection of Egyptian infl uences required both military forces and effi cient 
diplomacy. How very volatile the situation there could be was shown during the Second 
and Third Syrian Wars; although the latter brought the Ptolemies considerable success, 
the former saw them incur painful losses.22 A few years prior, in 227, the third power 
in the Hellenistic world, Macedonia, had signalled their interest in this area, although 
Antigonus Doson’s Carian campaign was not necessarily aimed against the Ptolemies.23 
The Aegean region was always in the centre of attention of Egyptian kings, who strove 
to expand and protect their lands on the one hand, and to support the local smaller states 
against the Seleucids on the other. The Ptolemaic policy of backing Seleucids’ enemies 
in Asia Minor was an additional factor that could have made Antiochus III reignites the 
confl ict with Egypt. The Ptolemaic diplomacy was keenly interested in every king and 
city that might limit the enemy’s infl uence in the region. In turn, for these smaller Asian 
Minor rulers the Ptolemies were a dream partner that could balance the Seleucids’ infl u-
ence; e.g. there had been ties of friendship between the Ptolemies and Ziaelas, the king 
of Bithynia, from the 240s onwards.24 However, the Egyptians’ highest hopes rested 
with the Seleucids’ most active enemy, Attalus I of Pergamon. Alexandria essentially 
limited their backing to fi nancial support, but Magas’ expedition showed that it was also 
capable of conducting direct military operations.
Towards the very end of his rule, Ptolemy III supported Attalus I in his fi ght against 
Antiochus Hierax – successfully enough for the ally to take over the lion’s share of the 
Seleucids’ dominions in Asia Minor. Hierax was detained in Egypt and an attempt to es-
20 Similarly Huss (1976: 30), who also surmises that the price Achaeus might have paid for his coopera-
tion with Ptolemy was giving up Coele-Syria. This is possible, although in the light of the chora doriktetos 
principle such an agreement could not have been very important in the future. What is very likely is Huss’ 
hypothesis that Egypt was hoping for a more permanent disruption of the Seleucid monarchy, since it was 
doubtful that Molon would offer submission to Achaeus after the latter’s possible victory. The Seleucids 
descending into internal confl ict was the best defence for Coele-Syria.
21 Plb. 5.63.8.
22 During the Second Syrian War, Antiochus II managed to capture a number of footholds in Ionia and 
take over numerous cities in Cilicia and Pamfi lia. Another warning for the Ptolemies in the Aegean region 
was the fl eet’s defeat at Andros in ca. 245, even if it did not considerably weaken Egyptian infl uences in 
the Aegean Sea basin. Cf. P.Haun. 6, frg. 1.11.8–9; Pomp. Trog. prol. 26–27; Plut. Arat. 12.2; Plut. Mor. 183 
C.545; App. Syr. 65; Orth 1977: 153–156; Buraselis 1982: 160–170; Hölbl 2001: 43–45; Huss 2001: 271–286.
23 Crampa 1969, no. 7; Plb. 20.5.11. cf. Bengtson 1971; Will 1979: 334–335.
24 SIG I, 456. The letter, preserved in an inscription, is most commonly dated to ca. 246–242: Heinen 
1984: 425. For the Ptolemies’ policy in Asia Minor at that time, cf. Huss 1976: 88–102; Beyer Rotthoff 1993: 
68–83.
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cape ended in his death.25 However, Hierax was replaced by Achaeus, who was a much 
more diffi cult opponent. Around 223–222 Ptolemy III sent Attalus reinforcements un-
der the command of his younger son, Magas, but to no avail – Achaeus was quickly 
driving the Pergamon king out of the newly captured territories.26 Magas’ campaign 
ended swiftly but it was likely one of the reasons for the outbreak of the Fourth Syrian 
War.27 Antiochus could not idly watch events that were threatening his state’s interests. 
On the other hand, the 221 campaign to Coele-Syria launched by the Seleucid king must 
have activated the new rulers in Egypt. An expert diplomat like Sosibios knew that there 
are no eternal enemies in politics and enlisting the help of Achaeus could have been 
benefi cial. It cannot, therefore, be excluded, that Alexandria inspired his usurpation to 
some extent.
One of the reasons to believe this is Polybius’ account (5.57.2) mentioning a letter 
Antiochus III sent to Achaeus, in which the king informed him that he was aware of 
the rebel’s secret collaboration with Ptolemy. It follows from another fragment of The 
Histories (5.42.7) that Hermeias forged Achaeus’ letter to Antiochus in which the former 
supposedly informed the ruler that Ptolemy III promised him fi nancial and military 
support if he turned against the rightful king. Hermeias supposedly did so to persuade 
Antiochus to attack Coele-Syria. However, keeping in mind the hostility that the author 
of Polybius’ source felt towards Hermeias, it is very likely that such a letter did indeed 
exist, and Ptolemy’s contacts with Achaeus did occur.28 Besides, it would be odd if 
– faced with Antiochus’ preparations for a war for Coele-Syria – Alexandria made no 
attempt to hold the enemy in check elsewhere. The fi asco of Magas’ expedition could 
have activated Ptolemy even further. Sosibios had another trump in his hands – An-
dromachus, Achaeus’ father, who had been kept prisoner in Egypt for several years.29 
Andromachus was soon released. According to Polybius, the Alexandrians considered 
using the prisoner against Antiochus, but following insistent requests from the Rho-
dians (who were friendly with the Ptolemies), involved in a confl ict with Byzantium and 
trying to establish friendly relations with Achaeus, he was sent back to his son. This 
whole passage would indicate that Ptolemy and Sosibios, dragged through mug and 
mire by Polybius, were capable of very noble gestures! Such a version of events does not 
sound realistic: in high politics gestures are important but it is actions that count. What 
is also doubtful is emphasising the Rhodian initiative in the matter. Polybius proba-
bly gathered his information about the endeavours to free Andromachus from Rhodian 
25 Just. 27.3.9–11.
26 P.Haun. 6, frg. 1.11.19; 28–31; Plb. 4.48.2–11.
27 Huss 1976. According to him, the Seleucus who had just died (P.Haun. 6, frg. 1.11.19; 28–31) was 
Seleucus III, so he places Magas’ mission in this context, contra: Habicht 1980.
28 Meloni (1949: 542), Brown (1961: 193–195), Will (1962: 91) believe that the letter did not exist but 
was invented by historians who worked on the court in Antioch. Schmitt (1964: 161–163) rightly observed 
that fabricating such a letter was not in Hermeias’ best interest, since planting the seed of doubt about 
Achaeus in the king’s mind could have ruined the plans for the Syrian war. Besides, it follows clearly from 
the letter that Achaeus at the time was loyal to the king. Holleaux (1942: 132 n. 3), Walbank (1967: 502, 573), 
and Huss (1976: 28) also voiced their doubts about Polybius’ account on this matter.
29 Plb. 4.51.1–4. The time and circumstances of Andromachus becoming an Egyptian prisoner are only 
hypothetical. Walbank (1967: 505) and Will (1979: 313–314) believe that he was captured by Attalus during 
the war with Seleucus III and passed over to the Lagids. It could also have occurred during Magas’ Asian 
Minor campaign: Huss 2001: 390 n. 27.
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sources, as evidenced e.g. by the way he described the confl ict between the Rhodians 
and the Byzantines, clearly showing much more sympathy towards the former.30
They were supposedly acting in the interest of almost all peoples negatively affected 
by the duty imposed by Byzantium on all those crossing the Hellespont. The way the ne-
gotiations regarding Andromachus were described, with praise heaped on the Rhodians’ 
cleverness, also supports this belief. Naturally, the Rhodians’ mediation is not impos-
sible – they were interested in winning over Achaeus – but it is impossible for Ptolemy 
and his advisor to let their most important bargaining chip to leave their hands like 
this. Setting Andromachus free should not, therefore, be necessarily believed to be the 
beginning of Ptolemy’s cooperation with Achaeus. It could have been a gesture that was 
only supposed to strengthen closer relationship between the two parties.31 The fact that 
Ptolemy detained Andromachus for while after Achaeus’ usurpation does not neces-
sarily mean that he had not started cooperation with the Egyptian king. Ptolemy and 
Sosibios might have made letting Achaeus’ father go dependent on Achaeus’ actions. 
His usurpation was undoubtedly heavily distorted by authors connected to Antiochus 
III, and who knows – perhaps the account of Achaeus’ campaign to Syria to eliminate 
Antiochus III is the most explicit example of such manipulations. In Lycaonia, soldiers 
reportedly rebelled against the usurper when they realised he was leading them against 
the rightful king. Pisidia fell victim to the confusion. Wanting to save face, Achaeus 
declared that he had no intention whatsoever to start a war against Antiochus and it was 
this mountainous land that was the target of his campaign. As a result, Pisidia was se-
verely plundered, the general regained his prestige, and the content soldiers, laden with 
spoils, returned to Lydia.32 In the eyes of the author from whom Polybius borrowed his 
information, such a description of the events was to leave no doubt as to which side was 
in the right and had the army’s support. However, considering the problems that the in-
habitants of the mountainous Pisidia posed to everyone who tried to control them, their 
resistance could just as well have been used to explain Achaeus aborting the expedition 
to Syria. The pacifi cation of Pisidia must have taken Achaeus a while, so he could have 
concluded that he should wait for the next suitable moment to attack – e.g. the moment 
when Antiochus would have attacked Egyptian dominions in Syria. He also could have 
reckoned that it would be better to meet the rival on his own territory, behind the Taurus 
Mountains, where – as Antiochus was later to found out – Achaeus was an exceptionally 
diffi cult opponent.33
Thus, the Ptolemies and Achaeus had a mutual enemy – Antiochus III. However, it 
is diffi cult to determine whether the ties they entered into had a more formal nature. 
As has been rightly noted, the course of events during the Fourth Syrian War allows us 
to put forward the hypothesis that there was a formal agreement.34 First and foremost, 
30 Plb. 4.47.
31 Similarly Huss 1976: 36.
32 Plb. 5.57.6.
33 Plb. 7.15–18; 8.15–23. It took Antiochus three long years to defeat the rebel.
34 Huss 1976: 37, contra Schmitt 1964: 170.
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the Ptolemaic side demanding that Achaeus be included in the peace treaty during the 
negotiations in the winter of 219/218 seems to support this theory.35
Achaeus’ contacts with Egypt in turn forced Antiochus III to react quickly. He had 
to act fast to break the alliance that was dangerous for him, since his opponents could 
always attack from two sides. He decided to recapture Seleucia Pieria, a sea port key 
for the dynasty.36 His attack on the city in the spring of 219 meant a renewal of the war 
with Egypt.37 It follows from Polybius’ account that after capturing Seleucia, instead of 
immediately marching to Coele-Syria, Antiochus intended to set off against Achaeus. 
He had sent troops under the command of Theodotus Heliolios to Coele-Syria, but the 
general’s job was to man the key points and protect the border.38 In this way, instead of 
continuing military operations, Antiochus deliberately gave Ptolemy additional time 
to prepare. It was only the news of the treason committed by the Ptolemaic general 
Theodotus that persuaded the Seleucid king to change his plans and continue his attack 
against the Lagids’ dominions. Polybius gives no comment as to the Seleucid king’s 
quandary. The only possible explanation would be some sort of offensive action under-
taken by Achaeus. The historian from Megalopolis mentions no such explanation, but 
we do know that when the truce was negotiated later, in the autumn of 219, Antiochus 
gathered his army in winter quarters in Seleucia Pieria since Achaeus, cooperating with 
Ptolemy, was plotting against him.39 It is entirely possible that the Lagids’ ally had start-
ed his scheme earlier. Researchers often minimize the extent of cooperation between 
Philopator and Achaeus. Rejecting the possibility of Achaeus undertaking offensive 
steps, or at least a limited diversion against Antiochus, they believe that Antiochus fell 
victim to disinformation initiated by the Egyptian side.40 However, fi rstly this underes-
timates the Seleucid king’s secret service and secondly, some information cited by Poly-
bius indicates good cooperation between Alexandria and Sardes. During the 219/218 
negotiations, Ptolemy brought mercenaries stationed in foreign cities to Alexandria41 
and this term probably also, or maybe fi rstly, refers to Asian Minor cities, i.e. cities in 
the sphere where Achaeus was active.
Ultimately, however, Achaeus’ participation in the Fourth Syrian War was negligi-
ble, perhaps mainly due to the fact that he had to grapple Attalus I in Asia Minor.42 It 
is entirely possible that although sources are silent on the matter, the king of Pergamon 
was driven to war by Antiochus III, since Achaeus’ cooperation with Egypt changed 
the political situation in the region. Pergamon, up until then often acting in concurrence 
with the Ptolemies, had to revise its strategy. Achaeus, after all, was Attalus’ main op-
35 Plb. 5.67.12–14. Errington (2008: 174–175) believes that at the time Antiochus considered Achaeus 
his co-ruler, and Achaeus was given the stigma of rebel after the Ptolemaic-Seleucid negotiations during 
the Fourth Syrian War. According to him, otherwise Sosibios would not have demanded for the rebel to be 
included in the treaty. In this way, however, he does not appreciate the fact that Achaeus cooperated with 
Egypt or the place he occupied in the Ptolemaic policy.
36 Cf. Jähne 1974: 509–513 for the signifi cance of the port.
37 Plb. 5.60–61.
38 Plb. 5.59.2; 5.61.3.
39 Plb. 5.66.3.
40 Schmitt 1964: 167–171; Will 1982: 25–26; 30–31, contra Huss 1976: 41–42.
41 Plb. 5.63.8.
42 Plb. 5.75–78; Robert 1937: 185–198; Holleaux 1938: 17–42; Schmitt 1964: 262–264; Ma 2000: 58–60.
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ponent. This should naturally have led to closer relations between the king of Pergamon 
and Antiochus III. The outcome of the Fourth Syrian War was ultimately decided at 
Raphia, and this time the victorious Ptolemy IV did not motion to include Achaeus in 
the peace talks.43 We are inclined to agree with the researchers who conclude that after 
Antiochus’ defeat it was not in Ptolemy’s interest to solve internal arguments in the 
Seleucids’ state or to protect Achaeus’ position. On the contrary, it was benefi cial for 
him if Antiochus had an opponent who would engage his forces.44 It is also worth noting 
that it was not in Ptolemy’s best interest to weaken Antiochus excessively due to the dy-
nasty’s interests in Asia Minor. Achaeus gaining too much strength could have proved 
unfavourable in time. The Alexandrians fully realised that too often political alliances 
were very volatile. The Ptolemies themselves had conducted such policy in Greece or 
Asia Minor, as Cleomenes III and the Achaean League had found out to their detriment.
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